Despite many theories on port pricing have been discussed in literature, e.g. cost-based, market based and cost-benefit theories, empirical research on this topic remains very limited. Especially, no study has been found to investigate the determinants of port infrastructure charges. This paper seeks to empirically analyse port infrastructure charges using the data of 159 worldwide ports across different geographic regions. The result of simultaneous equation regression with channel dues and berth occupancy charges as the (dependent) variables representing port infrastructure charges indicates that the pricing of seaport infrastructure is primarily cost-based but other factors also relevant to the port pricing models are actually used by the ports. Among those factors, in particular, demand and the port management and governance model have been found to significantly impact port infrastructure charges. Given the explanatory nature of its research, the paper also discusses the limitations and implications for port authorities, policy makers and future research.
Introduction
External factors behind the changes in port operations and management have put pressures on port competition, which has increased to a level never seen in the past. These factors include globalisation of production, changing technology, shifting bargaining power to users, and changing distribution patterns, which have respectively resulted in changes in port operations and management structures as ports have become value adders, a need for improving port productivity, the emergence of mega carriers and global port logistics service providers influencing a port's bargaining power, and the arrival of hub ports creating more competition between ports (The World Bank, 2007) . In addition, for ports to be efficient and competitive, port reforms have been undertaken worldwide with the private sector significant involvement in port operations, investments, development and management (e.g. ownership/ partnership). Although most ports still have substantial market power, it is undeniable that ports are now under more pressure to become more competitive and responsive to changes in market conditions with various strategies. It is noted that port pricing strategies are important as intermodalism results in more competition between ports and supply chains. However, the contestability of the port industry will affect the way ports price their services. This has made port pricing a complex matter for various reasons. First, ports have been and remain to play a dual role as a public asset and profit-making business. Second, ports offer a wide range of services that are subject to different levels of competition. Third, port charges, tariffs and rates need to be kept transparent. This paper's focus is on seaport infrastructure tariffs. While pricing strategies are often influenced by the cost of production, market structure, demand and institutional factors (Tyndall (Tyndall, 1951) , they are more complex for ports for various reasons. First, most ports nowadays operates as providers of multiple services, whose operations are interdependent. Therefore splitting production cost for pricing purposes can be very difficult if not infeasible. In addition, since port investments in ports are largely "irreversible" and therefore "sunk" costs, operational costs play an important role especially in short-term pricing. Second, as ports are regarded as both public assets and businesses, a port's pricing strategy can vary substantially depending on which role it wants to focus on. Third, port pricing is often subject to strong regulations, changes to port tariffs and charges requires careful planning and justification. Fourth, as shown in Nguyen (2011) , because ports are logistics nodes, pricing should take into account both competition between ports and coopetition within the supply chain, which imply the equilibrium price can be even outside the competitive-monopoly price range. Despite extensive research on port pricing, most studies mainly focus on only the theoretical or policy aspects. For example, European port reforms 4 have shown a new direction towards maritime pricing especially in port infrastructure with much focus on the full cost recovery approach (Gardner, Marlow and Pettit, 2006) , no empirical research has been found on this approach, nor is there much attention given to the effect of the above mentioned issues on port pricing.
This study seeks to address some of the above mentioned gaps especially in empirical research on port pricing. It examines the infrastructure related charges of 159 sea-ports in the world and empirically examines the relationship between port charges and other factors using the simultaneous equation regression method. The study tries to cover as many factors as available data can accommodate, including those relating to production, cost, market and institution. Because of the exploratory nature of research, the focus is on the main port infrastructure tariffs imposed on vessels (i.e. marine charges), namely conservancy charge and berth occupancy charge, whose data are can be standardised for regression analysis. Conservancy charge applies to the provision of navigation infrastructure including dredged channel and turning basins. For many ports this charge is also referred as port due. Berth occupancy charge is the charge for the use of berth and is also referred to as berth hire in some countries. The next section reviews port tariff structures and existing studies on port pricing, followed by Section 3, the analysis methods, and Section 4, the analysis results. Section 5 discusses the findings and implications, and section 6 is the conclusions.
Literature Review
Port tariffs are the main source of income for the port operator. The design of the suitable tariff structure is a necessary, first step in port pricing. Tariff structures tend to differ substantially across countries and regions, because of the variations in the port governance model, national port policy, accounting and financing practices, and the view of port management. Among the main differences are those in channel dues and berth hire. Some countries use Net Registered Tonnage (NRT) 5 as the scale factor for charging channel due and berth hire, while others use Gross Tonnage (GT) following the International Tonnage Certificate of vessels established by the London Tonnage Convention in 1969. This difference is partly due to the fact that NRT can be easily abused by a smaller change in the ship design, while GT or GRT relatively represents the volume of vessels.
Based on a sample of 118 seaports, the current study found 72percent of the ports use GT/GRT as the scale factor for channel/port due and about 53percent adopt the same for berth occupancy charge. However, 21percent of the ports studied use Length Overall of the vessel (LOA) as the scale factor for berth occupancy charge. UNCTAD (1995) and ESCAP (2002) recommend that ports standardise their tariff structure as a way to improve business efficiency and transparency. Table 1 presents the nomenclature of port tariffs adapted from the tariff structures recommended by these organisations and based on the authors' review of 118 sea-ports. (ESCAP, 2002; UNCTAD, 1995) Port infrastructure is originally considered as part of social overhead capital and mainly financed through taxation of the government budgets. Thus, pricing of port infrastructure was purely on the basis of welfare maximization. Despite the arguments on port infrastructure not featuring public goods characteristics (Baird, 2004) , the pricing of port infrastructure in most port around the world are under the purview of public statutory body, in most cases port authorities. However, this has changed greatly as a result of port reforms and active participation of the private sector and transnational port operators. Initial port reforms required the cost-recovery approach to pricing be taken to lessen fiscal burden for the government. Subsequent reforms allowed for more active role of the private sector that resulted in more competition and port financing using external funding, which put a further pressure on ports to come up with new pricing strategies that address the port's market position and enable it to achieve the corporate financial goals.
Port infrastructure pricing are a long discussed research topic and also considered to be a traditional research topic (Pallis, Vitsounis, De Langen and Notteboom, 2011; Woo, Pettit, Beresford and Kwak, 2012) together with infrastructure pricing (Dowd and Fleming, 1994; Talley, 1994) . Contributions to research on port pricing mainly concentrate on theory and policy (Abbes, 2007; Button, 1979; Dowd and Fleming, 1994; Haralambides, Verbeke, Musso and Benacchio, 2001; Strandenes, 2004; Thomas, 1978) . Port infrastructure pricing, apart from the earliest contribution by Heggie (1974) , heavily concentrates on determining an optimal port infrastructure charge following European Union policy decisions and actions on creating a level playing field in maritime operations (Haralambides, 2002; Meersman, Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2003 ) .
Several approaches to port infrastructure pricing are covered in the literature. Cost based pricing, referred to as traditional approach to seaport infrastructure, is popular among researchers. Marginal cost pricing (Abbes, 2007; Button, 1979; Goss and Stevens, 2001; Haralambides, 2002; Meersman, Monteiro, Pauwels, Voorde and Vanelslander, 2007; Swahn, 2002 ) is widely discussed, and some empirical research has been carried out with respect to cost based pricing in general including full cost recovery -average cost pricing (Gardner et al., 2006) , port pricing practices (Dowd and Fleming, 1994; Thomas, 1978) , cost-axiomatic pricing (Talley, 1994) and determining efficient port prices (Perez-Labajos and Esteban Garcia, 2000) , and strategic pricing (Ashar, 2001) . As a whole these literature emanates the multi-dimensionality of port pricing research and the majority of works are of the form of theoretical justifications, view and recommendations. Despite a handful of research has analysed port pricing using a viable research methodology and a framework (Ashar, 2001; Gardner et al., 2006; Perez-Labajos and Esteban Garcia, 2000; Talley, 1994) , they have not considered port infrastructure pricing in isolation. Notably, Gardner et al. (2006) provide further impetus to port pricing research in terms of cost relatedness of port tariffs. They find that seaports in the EU context design port tariffs with the view of achieving full cost recovery of port operations. Therefore the extent to which port tariffs are based on cost of providing port services determine the ability of port management to have full cost recovery. This raises the question as to what extent port tariffs are cost related and to what extent world seaports conform to this pricing practise in general. The methodology proposed by Perez-Labajos & Esteban Garcia (2000) is a valuable contribution to understand and estimate efficient port tariffs for the services of commercial seaports, yet it fails to capture cost element of port infrastructure in isolation. The economic model suggested by Xiao et al.(2010) to evaluate the impact of port ownership and competition on port investments and pricing is theoretically sound but difficult to test empirically given the constraint such as availability of port cost data. In generic terms, port infrastructure pricing research is largely devoted in the discussion of port pricing theory and its application in the port industry (See Abbes, 2007; De Borger, Proost and Van Dender, 2008; Haralambides, 2002; Haralambides et al., 2001; Meersman et al., 2007; Meersman, Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2002) while a significant number of research has uncovered the contemporary port tariff structure of world seaports, charging practices and its significance in general (see Dowd and Fleming, 1994; Psaraftis, 2005; Strandenes, 2004; Thomas, 1978; Wilmsmeier, 2007) .
As the above review indicates, the difficulty in assessing port costs specially marginal costs and the identification of the costs associated with specific port operations are among the challenges in port pricing (Haralambides (2002) ); identifying and evaluating port infrastructure pricing with respect to its costs and possible determinants remains as a major research gap in the literature. Existing research on seaport pricing mainly focuses on the theoretical and policy perspectives with very little empirical research that the current study concerns.
Methodology
The methodology of the study is mainly characterized by an econometric model to study two main port infrastructure tariffs. The study first obtained results with the use of a multiple regression model based on Ordinary Least Square Estimation and later results are compared with the results of a simultaneous equation system comprised with two equations for each of the two port infrastructure tariffs. The later methodology is important due to the fact that the diagnostics test of simultaneity for both port infrastructure tariffs indicates that one port infrastructure tariff is found to be endogenous in the regression model. The methodology is capable of analysing port infrastructure tariffs with respect to several of its possible determinants including the impact of the port management type and port governance model on the port infrastructure tariffs in general. Further, it captures the differences in port infrastructure tariffs with respect to the port region where the port is situated.
Because of the unavailability of data for port costs, port infrastructure specifications are used as proxies for port costs. The estimated regression model based on log-transformed variables has the following specifications:
where:
• DPM is the dummy variable indicating whether the port is a port authority (DPM1≡DPMPA), port corporation (DPM2≡DPMPCR), port public/limited company (DPM3≡DPMLC) or local government as the bench marking business model • DPG is the dummy variable indicating the port is a landlord (DPG1≡DPGLL), service (DPG2≡DPGS), service-landlord (DPG3≡DPGSL) or private port as the bench marking governance model • DPR is the dummy variable for geographical region, indicating whether the port is in the African (DPR1≡DPRAF), Australian (DPR2≡DPRAU), East Asian (DPR3≡DPREA), North American (DPR4≡DPRNA), North West European (DPR5≡DPRNWE), South Asian (DPR6≡DPRSA), West-Middle East region (DPR7=DFRWME) and the rest of the word as the bench mark
Note that as variables are in the log form, the coefficients represent the elasticity. Cluster sampling was used to in data collection. Nine (9) clusters were sampled representing major port regions and including 159 seaports 6 . Data requirement for the study includes port infrastructure tariffs of world ports, port infrastructure data, port throughput and total trade of the respective port country. Cross sectional data on two main port tariffs and port infrastructure are collected from several sources. Port tariffs were quoted on the basis of US$(PPP) per 100 GT/GRT. Port infrastructure specifications are in meters (m). Port infrastructure tariff, channel/port dues and berth occupancy charge, and port throughput in metric tons are mainly obtained from official web sites of port authorities and, where no tariffs are published, tariffs were obtained by requesting port authorities. Port infrastructure data which includes port channel and berth specifications were obtained from Ports and Terminal Guide published by Lloyd's Register-Fairplay Ltd (2011) and official web sites of respective seaports. Data on external trade, the sum of export and import, of each port country are obtained from the official web site of the World Trade Organization. More importantly, port tariffs published in other currency units other than US$ were converted to universally comparable common currency using purchasing power parity index (PPPI) published by The World Bank. Port data on the type of port managing organization, the port governance model and the port region are also collected and considered as dummy variables in the analysis.
Analysis Results
The analysis includes 153 observations out of 159 observations after removing the outliers from the sample. Tables I and II provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables in natural log. As can be seen from Table I , the values of the standard deviation for all the variables are small relative to their means. Table II shows port infrastructure tariffs, ݈݊ ‫ܨܴܶ‬ , ݈݊ ‫ܨܴܶ‬ , are positively correlated. The correlation between channel/port dues and berth occupancy charge is 0.39. More importantly channel/port dues, ݈݊ ‫ܨܴܶ‬ is positively correlated with channel length, ݈݊ ‫ܮܪܥ‬ at 0.29, but negatively correlated with channel depth, ‫ܦܪܥ݈݊‬ at 0.20. There is high correlation between port throughput, ݈݊ ܲܶܲ and berth length, ݈݊ ‫,ܮܤ‬ with the correlation coefficient of 0.55, and between ݈݊ ܲܶܲ and ݈݊ ‫ܦܤ‬ with the correlation coefficient of 0.47. there are two lines of regression results for equations (1) and (2) respectively. The third column shows the value of R-square. For example model (I) excludes all the dummy variables, while Model VIII includes all the dummy variables.
The Hausman test for the simultaneity problem was conducted 7 . The Hausman test for the dependent variables suggests that ݈݊ ‫ܨܴܶ‬ is determined simultaneously with ݈݊ ‫ܨܴܶ‬ . Thus a simultaneous equation system (SES) is appropriate. However, as shown below, the results obtained from all the 2SLS and 3SLS methods are highly consistent with those provided by the OLS method. In support of the simultaneous equation analysis, we examined the over identification restrictions of both regression equations by using Hausman Specification test statistic. However the test statistics for both simultaneous equations ln TRF ୡ୧ (H = 11.29 p = 0.0007) and ln TRF ୠ୧ (H = 8.27 p = 0.0040) are significant at 1% significance level in which case the null hypothesis that some instruments used in both simultaneous equations, ln TRF ୡ୧ and ln TRF ୠ୧ are not valid, is rejected. Since the analysis used cross-sectional data, the heteroskedasticity correction covariance matrix was used to address the heteroskedasticity problem.
As can be seen from Table III , the analysis results identify several factors that have a significant effect on port infrastructure charges. Especially, berth occupancy charge, channel length, channel depth and trade flow of the port's country are highly significant. Channel depth is however not highly significant in the model except in MODELs III and VII with the coefficient of channel depth being -0.51 and -0.55 respectively, only significant at 10%. The berth length and depth variables, representing the cost of berth maintenance, are however insignificant.
The model is included with several dummy variables in order to understand the impact of port managerial and spatial aspects on port infrastructure tariffs. Our model suggests that the coefficients for the port business model are significant but only for the channel due. In particular, it seems that the port authority and port corporation models do not have the same pricing system as the other business models, namely limited company and local government. The regression result also indicates that the port governance model also has significant impact on port pricing in some of the functional specifications under study. The result is however inconclusive. In addition, port infrastructure pricing methods used in Australia and northwest European countries tend to be significantly different from each other and from the rest of the word. The statistical analysis procedure is also included with several diagnosis tests including the normality and simultaneity tests. As shown in the table III, the Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test statistic 8 is calculated to test the normality of the distribution of channel/port dues and berth occupancy charges. The JB normality statistics for channel/port dues is 6.9 indicating that the null hypothesis of normality of the distribution of channel/port due data is cannot be rejected at 1%. The normality test conducted for berth occupancy charge also suggests the similar distribution. 
Discussion of the Findings and Implications
The result of regression analysis presented in the previous section shows that sea-port pricing is significantly affected by a number factors, namely channel length, channel depth, trade flow, various business structure and governance models, geographical region, as well as the relationship between port charges themselves. This section discusses and interprets the results obtained from regression analysis presented in section 4.
First, the analysis found significant two-way relationship between channel due and berth occupancy charge as the two main infrastructure charges. The analysis result indicates that the average value of the coefficient for berth occupancy charge (in natural log) is about 0.38, which is the cross elasticity of channel due with respect to berth occupancy charge 9 . This means that, all else remaining the same, an increase in berth occupancy charge by 1% is associated with an increase in channel due by 0.38%. On the other hand, the average value of the coefficient for the channel due variable (in natural log) of 0.40 indicates that, all else remaining the same, an increase in channel due by 1% is associated with an increase in berth due by 0.4%. The existence of this two-way relationship strongly suggests that one should not use the inverse of the coefficient for the berth due variable, which is 0.38 -1 =2.63, as the elasticity of this variable with respect to channel due. The values of coefficients for other variables can be interpreted in a similar fashion. The significance of the channel length variable with the average value of its coefficient of 0.26 indicates that, all else remaining the same, an increase in channel length by 1% would increase the channel due by 0.26%.
Berth infrastructure specifications, berth length and depths are found to have insignificant effect on berth occupancy charge. This may be due to the fact that there are other factors affecting berth occupancy charge. Moreover, in some ports, this charge tends to be incorporated into wharfage that is associated with terminal cargo handling service 10 .
The effect of channel width, ‫ܹܪܥ݈݊‬ , on channel due is insignificant, while it has also been found that the channel depth variable, lnCHD, has a negative effect on channel due. Although this variable is only significant in two out of ten regression specifications, its coefficient is as a consistent value of about -0.53, which suggests that, all else being the same, one percent increase in channel depth would result in about 0.53% decrease in channel due. This implies deeper channels would require less dredging cost, which according to Ghosh et al. (2001) , also depends on geographic, hydrographic characteristics of the channel, whose data are not available for empirical study purposes.
It is interesting to note that the total trade flow variable (export and import values) has a significant, negative impact on channel due, while the effect on berth due is insignificant in most regression specifications. The negative relationship between trade flow and channel due could be because of the fact that the former is strongly correlated with the port's output, which often exhibits the economies of scale in port operation. This could also be because of the 'demand' effect, whereby the lower the channel due, the higher the demand for port services. The value of the coefficient for the trave flow variable indicates that, all else being the same, an increase in total trade value by 1% is associated with a decrease in channel due by 0.11% on average.
The effect of various port business structure and governance models can be evaluated through the dummy variables' coefficients. The regression result indicates that the dummy variable for the 'port authority' business structure is significant with the average value of the coefficient of -1.0375. This means, all else being the same, channel dues charged by ports under the 'port authority' business structure are only 35% (100%.e -1.0375 ) of those charged by ports with the 'local government' business model used for benchmarking purposes. Similarly, the value of the coefficient for the 'port corporation' dummy of -1.11 indicates that, all else being the same, the channel dues for the 'port corporation' business structure is only 33% of those charged by ports under the 'local government' model. While the above values appear to be extreme, the sign of the dummy variables' coefficients does show that ports under the 'local government' business model tend to charge higher than those under other business models. The tariffs of ports managed by port authorities might be formulated subject to the approval of the relevant ministries thus the level of corporatizing tariff structure and the ability of the port authority to do so is hampered. The extent of this issue is reduced for commercialised ports under the port corporation business structure with the management given more autonomy in financing and pricing.
The dummy variables for the governance model can be interpreted in the same fashion as those for port business structures. The average value of the coefficient for the landlord model dummy variable, DPGLL, is -0.965, indicating that, under the same conditions, the average channel due of landlord ports is only 38% of that of private ports. The average value of the coefficient for the service port model of -0.84 shows that, under the same conditions, the average berth occupancy charge of service ports is only 43% of private ports, while the infrastructure changes of service-landlord (mixed model) ports are not significantly different from those of private ports. This finding is consistent with the fact that private ports are profit driven rather than social welfare driven and tend to charge higher than landlord and service ports.
The significance of the dummy variables for the Australian ports with the value of 0.73 means that, all else remaining the same, their channel due tends to be twice higher than those in the bench marking region. The average value of the coefficient for the northwest European region dummy variable of 0.9675 indicates that, under the same conditions, berth occupancy charges of ports in this region are 2.63 times higher than the bench marking region. This ratio is 1.59 for the channel dues of ports in south Asia and 0.41 for the berth occupancy charges of ports in the West-Middle East region, while infrastructure tariffs for ports in the other regions are not significantly different.
Conclusions
This paper examines port infrastructure charges using the data of 159 sea-ports. The result of simultaneous equation regression with channel due and berth occupancy charge as two dependent variables representing port infrastructure charges indicates a two-way relationship between channel due and berth occupancy charge. Channel/port due is positively related with channel length, while channel depth appears and country's trade flow appear to have inverse relationships with channel due. In addition, the latter has a positive effect on berth occupancy charge.
The study also found significant effects of the port business structure and governance model on infrastructure pricing. In particular, channel dues charged by ports under the 'port authority' and 'port corporation' business structures are lower than those under the 'local government' business structure. Landlord ports and service ports tend to charge less than private ports, implying that the former are supposed to play dual role, while the latter are more profit driven. In addition, infrastructure charges of Australian and northwest European ports are significantly higher than the rest of the world.
The findings of the research have some implications for port policy, pricing committees, port authorities, operators and managers. Efficient pricing is a prerequisite to making efficient infrastructure investments (Winston, 1991) . While public ports should aim to maximize user welfare, given the growth in demand for port services, they may need to evaluate the pricing approach in order to reduce the financial burden and consider the competition with private ports. Port managing bodies may be required to consider a suitable mechanism to establish cost based infrastructure tariffs, especially those of self-financing port managing bodies. The result of analysis strongly indicates that the cost-based approach plays a key role in port pricing but actual charges remain substantially different across port business structures, governance models and geographical regions in the word. In addition, very high charge of private ports may also mean their charges need to be monitored.
The study is subject to limitations that could be considered for future research. First, because of the unavailability of relevant data, port infrastructure dimensions were used as proxies for infrastructure costs. Second, due to its exploratory nature, the study only considered channel due and berth occupancy charge, while other charges especially terminal charges were not included. Thus, future study can extend the empirical framework and include additional charges, especially terminal charges to cargo owners/shippers and charges for other services such as pilotages. In addition, future student can also incorporate the role of competition, vertical relationship along the supply chain and port-regional development.
